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RÉSUMÉ — Bien qu'il existe des différences significatives entre la philosophie de
Mario Bunge et celle de Graham Harman, il existe également des similitudes fon-
damentales entre elles. Ces penseurs affirment tous deux qu'il est possible de dé-
velopper une théorie générale des objets. Le premier estime que la théorie en
question est logico-mathématique, tandis que le second suggère qu'elle est onto-
logique. Quoi qu’il en soit, ils conviennent que tous les objets doivent être consi-
dérés, qu’ils soient réels ou non. En outre, ils suggèrent que même si aucun objet
ne doit être exclu de la théorie, il est nécessaire d’en distinguer différents types.
ABSTRACT — Although there are significative differences between the philosophies
of Mario Bunge and Graham Harman, there are also some fundamental similari-
ties. One of the core features that they have in common is that both of them claim
that it is possible to develop a general theory of objects. The former believes that
the theory in question is logical-mathematical, while the latter suggests that it is
ontological. Regardless, they agree that all objects have to be considered, no mat-
ter if they are real or not. Furthermore, they suggest that even though no objects
should be excluded from the theory, it is necessary to distinguish different kinds of
them.
Keywords — Objects; Ontology; Metaphysics; Mario Bunge; Graham Harman.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In a sense, Mario Bunge and Graham Harman could not be further apart as phi-
losophers. The former advocates for scientism, while the latter criticizes it. One
of them has a low opinion of the work of Bruno Latour, while the other appreci-
ates it. Despite these and other key differences, I argue that there are certain
core similarities between their philosophies. We will see several examples, but
the first one is that both thinkers agree that it is possible to develop a general
theory of objects, and that there is no reason to exclude fictional objects from its
domain. In other words, a general theory of objects must deal with all kinds of
objects, no matter if these are real or not.
Harman had advanced this idea early in his career. The opening paragraph of
Guerrilla Metaphysics: Phenomenology and the Carpentry of Things is an example
of the general idea:
This book calls for what might be termed an object-oriented philosophy, and
in this way rejects both the analytic and continental traditions. The ongoing
dispute between these traditions, including the sort of “bridge building”
that starts by conceding the existence of the dispute, misses a prejudice
shared by both: their primary interest lies not in objects, but in human ac-
cess to them. The so-called linguistic turn is still the dominant model for the
philosophy of access, but there are plenty of others—phenomenology, her-
meneutics, deconstruction, philosophy of mind, pragmatism. None of these
philosophical schools tells us much of anything about objects themselves;
indeed, they pride themselves on avoiding all naive contact with nonhuman
entities. By contrast, object-oriented philosophy holds that the relation of
humans to pollen, oxygen, eagles, or windmills is no different in kind from
the interaction of these objects with each other. For this reason, the phi-
losophy of objects is sometimes lazily viewed as a form of scientific natural-
ism, since it plunges directly into the world and considers every object im-
aginable, avoiding any prior technical critique of the workings of human
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knowledge. But quite unlike naturalism, object-oriented philosophy adopts
a bluntly metaphysical approach to the relations between objects rather
than a familiar physical one. In fact, another term that might be employed
for object-oriented philosophy is guerrilla metaphysics—a name meant to
signify that the numerous present-day objections to metaphysics are not
unknown to me, but also that I do not find them especially compelling. (Har-
man, 2005: 1)
Bunge, for his part, had also been philosophizing about objects throughout his
career, particularly in the third volume of his Treatise on Basic Philosophy, titled
Ontology I: The Furniture of the World. In that work, though, he was skeptical of
the possibility of a general theory of objects:
Because unreal objects have nonphysical properties, they satisfy nonphysi-
cal laws if any. For this reason it is impossible to make any nontautological
statements applying to all objects: ontology, as conceived by Meinong and
Lesniewski, i.e. as a general theory of objects of any kind, and yet different
from logic, is impossible. (Bunge, 1977: 5)
However, several decades later, it seems that Bunge changed his mind. In 2010
he published Matter and Mind, and in Chapter 14 of that book, titled Appendix A:
Objects, he outlined a general theory of objects. It will be worthwhile to quote
the opening paragraphs in full:
In ordinary language, the word “object” denotes a material thing that can
be seen and touched. By contrast, in modern philosophy “object” (objec-
tum, Gegenstand) stands for whatever can be thought about: it applies to
concrete things and abstract ones, arbitrary assemblages and structured
wholes, electrons and nations, stones and ghosts, individuals and sets,
properties and events, facts and fictions, and so on.
The concept of an object is thus the most general of all philosophical con-
cepts. In fact, this concept is so general that it is used in all the branches of
philosophy in all languages—though not always consistently. For instance,
someone might say that the subjects of this chapter are objects, whereas
its object or goal is to elucidate “object”.
Yet, to my knowledge there is no generally accepted theory of objects.
True, mereology, or the calculus of individuals, was expected to fill that gap.
Regrettably, this theory is extremely complicated, uses an awkward nota-
tion, and does not accomplish much because, following the nominalist pro-
gram, it eschews properties. As for the theories of objects proposed by
Meinong and Routley, they are only moderately well known, possibly
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because they include impossible objects on a par with possible ones. The
goal of this paper is to formulate a general theory of objects free from those
flaws. However, the reader with no taste for symbolism is invited to skip
this chapter. (Bunge, 2010: 267)
Contrary to what he had written in the third volume of the Treatise, in this small
but important appendix to Matter and Mind he now believes that it is entirely
possible to develop a general theory of objects. This is particularly evident in the
list that he provides, since he mentions ghosts as an example of fictional objects.
Thus, Bunge and Harman agree that a general theory of objects must include fic-
tional entities. It cannot be reduced to a theory that deals exclusively with real
objects.
According to Harman, the general theory of objects has at least two phases.
The first one is called “flat ontology”. During this phase, all objects have to be
taken into consideration, no matter if they are real or fictional. However, he also
indicates that this is only a starting point, not a final destination. In his book Ob-
ject-Oriented Ontology: A New Theory of Everything, he says:
Briefly put, flat ontology is a good starting point for philosophy but a disap-
pointing finish. For example, earlier in this chapter I argued that philosophy
needs to be able to talk about everything—Sherlock Holmes, real humans
and animals, chemicals, hallucinations—without prematurely eliminating
some of these or impatiently ranking them from more to less real. We might
well have biases that make us think that philosophy is obliged only to deal
with natural objects but not artificial ones, which we might dismiss as un-
real. In this case as in many others, an initial commitment to flat ontology
is a useful way of ensuring that we do not cave in to our personal prejudices
about what is or is not real. Yet flat ontology would also be a disappointing
finish for any philosophy. If we imagine that after fifty years of philosophiz-
ing a OOO thinker were to say nothing more than ‘humans, animals, inani-
mate matter and fictional characters all equally exist’, then not much pro-
gress would have been made. In short, we expect a philosophy to tell us
about the features that belong to everything, but we also want philosophy
to tell us about the differences between various kinds of things. It is my
view that all modern philosophies are too quick to start with the second
task before performing the first in rigorous fashion. (Harman, 2018: 54–55)
In this sense, Harman suggests that two kinds of objects must be distinguished:
real objects and sensual objects. The former exist by themselves, independently
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of other objects, while the latter only exist in relation to a real object. We will say
more about this distinction later.
As we have seen, Bunge would agree with Harman that a general theory of
objects must acknowledge all kinds of objects, without excluding fictional ones
from its domain. He would also agree that the theory in question has to distin-
guish different kinds or types of objects. Thus he says:
So far we have not distinguished between concrete objects, such as numer-
als, and ideal objects, such as numbers. We proceed to introducing this dis-
tinction. (Bunge, 2010: 269)
He says this after discussing the concept of individuals and properties. Generally
speaking, Bunge thinks that individuals can be either real or fictional, and the
same can be said about properties. This can be interpreted as a fourfold, not en-
tirely unlike Harman’s.
As a note in passing, Bunge and Harman agree on another point: that an as-
sembly or a collection of objects is also an object in its own right. Harman had
discussed this point in his book Immaterialism: Objects and Social Theory. There,
and contrary to Leibniz, he argues that groups of objects are also objects, no mat-
ter if those groups are arbitrary assemblages. Bunge would agree, since he says:
A concatenate need not be a system; that is, no bonds need be involved:
an arbitrary assemblage of things counts as an object. (Bunge, 2010: 269)
Before we examine the different kinds of objects that these thinkers recognize,
we must address another issue: should the general theory of objects be a formal
science, as Bunge claims, or an ontology, as Harman suggests?
2 FORMAL SCIENCE OR ONTOLOGY?
One difference between Bunge and Harman regarding the general theory of ob-
jects has to do with the nature of the theory in question. For Bunge, it logical-
mathematical, and for Harman it is ontological. Part of this disagreement has to
do with the fact that they define the term “ontology” in different ways.
In his Treatise on Basic Philosophy, Bunge had traced a fundamental distinc-
tion between things and constructs. He claimed that ontology can only be a the-
ory about things, but not constructs. The latter should be studied by the disci-
pline of semantics, and more generally, by mathematics and logic. Even though,
decades later, he changed his mind regarding the possibility of a general theory
of objects, he did not change his mind regarding the definition of the term
Martín Orensanz | Bunge and Harman on the General Theory of Objects 6
Mεtascience | No.2 | 2020
“ontology”. Thus, he says that “ontologies are theories about the world” (Bunge,
2010: 275).
In this sense, and from the point of view of Matter and Mind, ontology would
be a branch of the general theory of objects, the one that deals with things and
everything pertaining to things. Constructs would be excluded from ontology,
but not from the general theory of objects.
Harman defines the term “ontology” in a different way. Noting that the terms
“ontology” and “metaphysics” have been defined in several different ways by
various thinkers, he proposes the following definitions:
Henceforth, let ‘ontology’ refer to a description of the basic structural fea-
tures shared by all objects, and let ‘metaphysics’ signify the discussion of
the fundamental traits of specific types of entities. (Harman, 2007: 204)
For Bunge, the terms “ontology” and “metaphysics” are synonymous, for Harman
they are not. However, one cannot help but wonder how divisive this difference
really is, since both thinkers agree that it is possible to develop a general theory
of objects. The only difference regarding this point is that one of them calls it
“ontology”, while the other one prefers to reserve this term for one of the
branches of the theory in question.
It seems to me that, regarding this point, if one asked, “who is right here,
Bunge or Harman?” then it would be necessary to indicate that what is being
discussed here is not a matter of fact, but of terminology. It is not as if one of
these philosophers declared “there is a cat on the mat” and the other one de-
clared, “it is not the case that there is a cat on the mat”. Because, for a situation
like that, one would only have to look at the mat to see if there is a cat on it or
not. That would be enough for determining who is right. But when the discussion
is about using the term “ontology” to refer to the general theory of objects, one
cannot explore the world to find some piece of evidence that corroborates or
refutes what is being claimed, there is nothing similar to finding a cat on the mat
for determining “who is right” in a terminological discussion.
If I may suggest an example taken from chess, it does not matter if I call a
certain piece a “knight” or a “horse” or an “apple”, what matters is how the piece
moves. In a similar fashion, I suggest that it does not matter what the general
theory of objects is called, what matters are the “rules of the game” that the the-
ory proposes. And, in this sense, despite the important differences between the
“rules” that Bunge and Harman propose, they do seem to agree on some of these
“rules”. Namely, that it is possible to develop a general theory of objects of any
kind.
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Having said this, let us take a look at the different kinds of objects according
to the theories of Bunge and Harman.
3 KINDS OF OBJECTS
In the Treatise on Basic Philosophy, Bunge claimed that objects are divided into
two fundamental kinds: things and constructs. In Matter and Mind, this is no
longer the case. Instead, the most general kinds of objects that he recognizes in
that text are individuals and properties. He says:
We shall presently propose an axiomatic theory of individuals of any kind.
The first section presupposes only the classical predicate calculus with iden-
tity, a bit of set-theoretic notation, and another of semi-group theory; the
balance of the chapter also uses the concept of a mathematical function.
The specific primitive (undefined) concepts are those of individual and
property. Like all primitives, these are elucidated by the postulates where
they occur. (Bunge, 2010: 267)
In the Treatise on Basic Philosophy, Bunge had also traced a fundamental distinc-
tion between properties and attributes. He defined the former as real, and the
latter as fictional. Things have properties, while constructs have attributes. How-
ever, in Matter and Mind, he seems to have abandoned this terminology, since he
speaks of properties in a general sense, no matter if these pertain to real or fic-
tional objects. Since individuals can be either real or fictional, and since the same
holds for properties, we can represent this as a fourfold: 1) real individuals, 2)
real properties, 3) fictional individuals, 4) fictional properties. This is similar to,
though not identical, to Harman’s fourfold: 1) real objects, 2) real qualities, 3)
sensual objects, 4) sensual qualities.
Recall that Bunge claimed in the Treatise on Basic Philosophy that “it is impos-
sible to make any nontautological statements applying to all objects” and that
for this reason it would be impossible to conceive a general theory of objects
distinct from logic. However, none of the definitions and axioms that he ad-
vanced decades later in Matter and Mind are tautological. Consider his Defini-
tion 1 and his first three axioms: “Definition 1 Every object is either an individual
or a property”, “Axiom 1 No object is both an individual and a property”, “Axiom 2
All individuals have at least one property”, and “Axiom 3 Every property is pos-
sessed by at least one individual” (Bunge, 2010: 268). This seems like additional
evidence for our suggestion that during the thirty-three years between the third
volume of the Treatise and the publication of Matter and Mind, Bunge changed
his point of view on the possibility of general theory of objects.
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We must examine Bunge’s and Harman’s quadripartite distinctions in more
detail, because there are some key differences between their philosophies on
this point. According to Bunge, fictional objects are brain processes. As such,
they can only be found in living animals endowed with nervous systems. They
do not have an autonomous existence. Thus he says:
For example, the Pythagorean theorem exists in the sense that it belongs
in Euclidean geometry. Surely it did not come into existence before some-
one in the Pythagorean school invented it. But it has been in conceptual
existence, i.e. in geometry, ever since. Not that geometry has an autono-
mous existence, i.e. that it subsists independently of being thought about.
It is just that we make the indispensable pretence that constructs exist pro-
vided they belong in some body of ideas—which is a roundabout fashion of
saying that constructs exist as long as there are rational beings capable of
thinking them up. Surely this mode of existence is neither ideal existence
(or existence in the Realm of Ideas) nor real or physical existence. To invert
Plato’s cave metaphor we may say that ideas are but the shadows of
things—and shadows, as is well known, have no autonomous existence.
(Bunge, 1977: 157)
It might strike the reader as strange that Bunge mentions the Pythagorean the-
orem as an example of a fictional object. One could think, as Quentin Meillassoux
(2008) does that mathematics is capable of disclosing the primary qualities of
things. Thus, Meillassoux traces a distinction between mathematical statements
and their referents. He says that the former are ideal, while the latter are real.
Bunge thinks that all mathematical objects are fictional, no matter their com-
plexity. Thus he says:
The mathematical objects, such as sets, functions, categories, groups, lat-
tices, Boolean algebras, topological spaces, number systems, differential
equations, vector spaces, manifolds, and functional spaces, are not only en-
tia rationis: they are ficta. (Bunge, 1997: 51)
If we had to express this idea using Harman’s terminology, we may say that
mathematical objects are not real objects, but sensual objects instead. What this
means is that the number 3 or a differential equation, for example, cannot exist
by themselves. They can only exist in relation to a real object: the person that is
thinking about them. If the previous quote was, for some reason, insufficient for
convincing the reader that Bunge is quite adamant about this point, then con-
sider the following one:
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Mathematical objects are then ontologically on a par with artistic and myth-
ological creations: they are all fictions. The real number system and the tri-
angle inequality axiom do not exist really any more than Don Quijote or
Donald Duck. (Bunge, 1985: 38–39)
Which is similar to the way in which Harman speaks about fictional characters
such as Sherlock Holmes. Bunge reiterated the previous idea several decades
later, so on this point, he did not change his mind:
In short, mathematicians, like abstract painters, writers of fantastic litera-
ture, ‘abstract’ (or rather uniconic) painters, and creators of animated car-
toons, deal in fictions. To put it into blasphemous terms: ontologically, Don-
ald Duck is the equal of the most sophisticated nonlinear differential equa-
tion, for both exist exclusively in some minds. (Bunge, 2006: 192)
Initially, it could seem ridiculous to compare a sophisticated mathematical equa-
tion to a cartoon character like Donald Duck. But, as Jean-Pierre Marquis noted,
that is not the case:
Donald Duck is not the problem. And it is not a priori ridiculous to compare
Donald Duck to mathematical objects with respect to their ontological sta-
tus. It is, in fact, rather fashionable these days and has been for some time.
It certainly goes in the right direction, but one has to travel carefully to
avoid certain pitfalls. (Marquis, 2019: 590)
A greater pitfall than the ones that Marquis alludes to, as far as I am concerned,
is the one that Meillassoux fell into in After Finitude, the pitfall of believing that
mathematics can disclose the primary qualities of an object. Because, for that to
be the case, mathematical truth would have to be absolute, not relative. Bunge is
against that idea:
Allow me to repeat a platitude: Mathematical truth is essentially relative or
context-dependent. For example, the Pythagorean theorem holds for plane
triangles but not for spherical ones; and not all algebras are commutative,
or even associative. (Bunge, 1997: 53)
According to Bunge, no matter how simple or complex an idea is, it is entirely
fictional, in the sense that it does not have an autonomous existence. Harman’s
point of view is similar, though not identical. No sensual object has an autono-
mous existence, it can only exist in relation to a real object. Thus, one of the basic
principles of his object-oriented ontology is the following one:
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Objects come in just two kinds: real objects exist whether or not they cur-
rently affect anything else, while sensual objects exist only in relation to
some real object. (Harman, 2018: 9)
Contrary to Bunge, Harman suggests that sensual objects are everywhere, not
only in relation to animals with nervous systems, but even among inanimate ob-
jects such as rocks. This is because the concept of a sensual object is a more gen-
eral notion than that of an idea. While all ideas are sensual objects, not all sensual
objects are ideas. To understand this point better, we must discuss a key element
of Kant’s philosophy: the distinction between the phenomenon and the thing-in-
itself.
Kant held that we cannot know what an object is as a thing-in-itself, we can
only know it as a phenomenon. What this means is that it appears to us in a par-
ticular way, not only due to the specific nature of our five senses and their cor-
responding organs, but also due to the way in which our sensory experience is
conditioned by the pure forms of intuition and the categories of the understand-
ing. We cannot get rid of these in order to know what the thing-in-itself is, as a
thing that is absolutely untainted and unfiltered by the senses and the mind. In
other words, we know things through filters, and it is because these filters exist
that the object of knowledge is a phenomenon, not an unfiltered thing-in-itself.
Let us see what Bunge thinks of the conceptual difference between appearance
and reality:
The perception of a fact is called a phenomenon or appearance. (In ordinary
language 'phenomenon' is equated with 'fact': beware of the imprecisions
of ordinary language.) There are imperceptible facts but there are no phe-
nomena without sentient organisms. Appearance, then, is an evolutionary
gain: it emerged together with the first animals equipped with nervous sys-
tems. Before them facts appeared to nobody: there was no appearance,
there was only reality. Phenomena are facts of a special kind, namely facts
occurring in nervous systems. So, phenomena are real. Consequently there
is no opposition between appearance and reality. My seeing the Moon
larger on the horizon than overhead is a fact no less than the two positions
of the Moon: only, the former is a perceptual, hence subjective, fact,
whereas the latter are objective physical facts. There is then nothing wrong
with admitting phenomena alongside nonphenomenal (or transphenome-
nal) facts. The opposition is not between appearance and reality but be-
tween subjective facts or accounts and objective facts or accounts. (Bunge,
1983: 150–151)
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Contrary to Kant, who believed that the distinction between appearances and
things-in-themselves pertains only to human beings, and contrary to anthropo-
centric philosophers in general (or “philosophers of access” to use Harman’s ex-
pression), Bunge does not reduce the concept of appearance to human appear-
ance:
We must define appearance, or the totality of phenomena, as the collection
of all (actual or possible) perceptual processes in all animals past, present
and future. (We may also specify and speak of human appearance, blue jay
appearance, sardine appearance, etc.)” (Bunge, 1983: 153)
Appearances are different depending on the species of animals. In Harman’s
terms, there are different sensual objects for the same real object. The way a
certain thing appears to a human being is different from how it appears to a blue
jay, or to a sardine. For example, the way that an acorn appears to a blue jay is
not the same as it appears to a squirrel, or to a human. Even though the real
object is always one and the same—for it is always the same acorn—, there are
many different appearances of it, depending on the animal that interacts with it:
human appearance, blue jay appearance, squirrel appearance, etc. One thing-in-
itself, many phenomena; one real object, many sensual objects. And these differ-
ent appearances of the acorn are always limited versions of what the acorn really
is as a thing-in-itself independent of the animals that encounter it. Or, to use Har-
man’s terminology, these appearances are distortions, caricatures, translations,
they are never as rich and fully featured as the real object.
The question here is if the distinction between the sensual object and the real
object stops at the level of animals endowed with nervous systems, or if this dis-
tinction can be found everywhere, even among inorganic objects such as rocks
and crystals.
Philosophical discussions about inanimate objects can sometimes be more
complicated than what one would initially expect. We began by recalling Kant’s
definitions of “phenomenon” and “thing-in-itself”, he thought that these per-
tained exclusively to human beings. We then considered Bunge’s redefinitions of
these terms, since there can be many different appearances relative to different
species of animals. Now we must philosophize about inanimate objects. As Iain
Hamilton Grant wrote, with great wit: “Life acts as a kind of Orphic guardian for
philosophy’s descent into the physical” (Grant, 2006: 10).
Let us descend then, into the realm of the inorganic. One conclusion that Kant
did not seem to explore enough is the following one: if the conceptual distinction
between phenomenon and thing-in-itself is exclusive to human beings, then, in
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the absence of human beings, nonhuman entities must interact with each other
as things-in-themselves. Consider the following example. When I perceive a
raindrop that falls on my hand, I am not interacting with the raindrop as a thing-
in-itself, but as a phenomenon, since I feel the raindrop through the filters and
conditions of my sensory experience. But when a raindrop falls on a rock, the
rock is not interacting with the raindrop as a phenomenon, it is interacting with
it as a thing-in-itself. If we can only know external objects as phenomena, then
in our absence these external objects must interact with each other exclusively
as things-in-themselves.
It seems that Bunge would agree with Kant on this point, although he would
not agree with Kant’s anthropocentric definition of the terms “appearance” and
“thing-in-itself”. Nevertheless, Bunge seems to believe that inanimate objects in-
teract with each other as things-in-themselves. Recall that he says that before
the emergence of animals endowed with nervous systems “there was no appear-
ance, there was only reality”. Thus, when a raindrop falls on a rock, there is no
“rock appearance” of the raindrop. There can only be a “human appearance” of
the raindrop when it falls on a human being, or a “blue jay appearance” of the
raindrop when it falls on a blue jay, and so on. But this never happens in the case
of inanimate objects. For it is clear that a rock does not have a nervous system,
so the raindrops that fall on it do not “appear” to it in any way.
By contrast, Harman claims that inanimate objects do not interact with each
other as things-in-themselves, but as sensual objects. While all appearances are
sensual objects, not all sensual objects are appearances. Therefore, if one agrees
with Harman on this point, it is not necessary to claim that the raindrops that fall
on a rock “appear” to it, it suffices to say that the raindrops interact with the rock
as sensual objects, which is to say, as objects in a relation to it. And they are in a
relation to it because, among other things, they fall from a certain direction: from
above, not from the sides or from below.
Instead of defining the term “thing-in-itself” as a thing that exists inde-
pendently of the way in which human beings interact with it, it can be defined as
a thing that exists independently of the way in which other entities in general
interact with it, not just human beings or other animals endowed with nervous
systems. When I look at a bird flying through the sky, the bird exists inde-
pendently of the fact that I am looking at it. But it also exists independently of
the rocks on the ground, and of the trees that it flies over. For if it did not, then
by removing the rocks and the trees, the bird would suddenly cease to exist.
Things-in-themselves, or real objects, to use Harman’s terminology, not only
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exist independently of human beings, they also exist independently of each other
as well.
Similar considerations apply to the term “phenomenon”. Instead of defining
it as an object that exists in a specific relation to human beings, it can be defined
as an object that exists in a specific relation to another object, not necessarily a
human being or other animal. To use the example of the bird again. The bird ex-
ists independently of the fact that I am looking at it, but the specific silhouette of
the bird that I see does not. If I only see the bird from the left side, then this
specific profile or silhouette cannot exist independently of the observer that is
looking at the bird from that specific angle. But the rocks on the ground are also
in a specific relation to the bird, since they are below it. And notions such as
above and below, left and right, are entirely relative. If I stand next to a tree, such
that it is to my left, and then I turn around, so that it is to my right, then the tree
as a thing-in-itself has not changed. But as a thing-in-itself, the tree cannot be
either to the left or to the right “in itself”, since it can only be to the left or to the
right in relation to other things. The “tree to the left of X” or the “tree to the right
of X” are examples of what Harman calls “sensual objects”. They only exist in
relation to a real object.
However, this does not mean that the many different silhouettes or profiles
of the bird, or of a certain tree, or of any other object, are simply a bundle of
qualities, as Hume and Berkeley argued. Harman argues that sensual qualities
are always supported by an underlying sensual object. This idea was inspired by
Husserl, and in particular by his critique of the "bundle of qualities" theory. Har-
man provides the following example:
Consider the example of a snowmobile. What Husserl gives us is the new
insight that the snowmobile is not just a bundle of snowmobile-qualities,
but an enduring object that is different from the relatively small array of
profiles or features that it shows in any given moment or any sum of mo-
ments. We see the snowmobile from one side or another, at a greater or
lesser distance, speeding towards us or away from us, standing motionless
or spinning wildly in a dangerous jump over a perilous crevice. In all of these
cases, we consider the snowmobile to be the same thing, unless something
happens to suggest that we have misidentified or confused it with a similar
vehicle. In OOO terminology, Husserl splits the sensual object snowmobile
from the sensual qualities of the snowmobile, since the former does not
change but the latter change constantly. (Harman, 2018: 78-79)
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The many different silhouettes of the bird that I see from different angles
could not exist by themselves, without the bird as an object that is being viewed
by me. When I stand next to a tree, either to the left or to the right, these are not
simply relations and nothing more, they are relations between a certain object
and myself.
4 KNOWLEDGE AND THE THING-IN-ITSELF
Another key difference between Bunge and Harman is that the former believes
that it is possible for human beings to know the thing-in-itself, while the latter
denies this. Here is what Bunge has to say on this issue:
Yet, however insignificant appearances may be from an ontological point of
view, they occupy a central position in epistemology. In fact, there is no way
of gaining some deep knowledge about reality except by combining phe-
nomena with hypotheses and processing both by reasoning. (Bunge, 1983:
153)
He then quotes several passages from William James. One of them sums up the
general idea:
Strange mutual dependence this, in which the appearance needs the reality
in order to exist, but the reality needs the appearance in order to be known!
(James, 1890: 301)
Harman does not believe that human beings can know the thing-in-itself. This
may sound perplexing at first, but there is an argument for it. In order to address
this issue, it will be useful to discuss Kant’s point of view further. While Kant
claimed that humans cannot know the thing-in-itself, he also claims that it is en-
tirely possible for humans to think about things-in-themselves. Subsequent phi-
losophers such as Hegel questioned this point, because in order to think about
something, there has to be a thinker. Therefore, it is not possible to think of
things-in-themselves, independently of humans, since this act requires the exist-
ence of thinking humans. In this specific sense, it is not the case that things-in-
themselves do not exist, rather it is the case that it is impossible for humans to
know what these things are independently of humans. So it is for blue jays and
sardines. A blue jay cannot have a “blue jay appearance” of an acorn inde-
pendently of the way that acorns appear to blue jays. A sardine cannot have a
“sardine appearance” of a small crustacean independently of the way that small
crustaceans appear to sardines. But what Harman suggests is that this situation
should not be limited to appearances, he argues that the thing-in-itself cannot be
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accessed by any means. Practical relations, for example, do not give us access to
a thing-in-itself any more than perceptual or theoretical relations do.
To use an example: when I look at a hammer, what is presented to my eyes is
not the hammer as a thing-in-itself, what is presented to me is an appearance of
the hammer. And, to use Bunge’s terms, it should be emphasized that this is not
any kind of appearance, but a very specific one, a “human appearance”, to be
distinguished from the kinds of appearances that would be presented to other
animals. Now, if instead of simply looking at the hammer, I decide to pick it up
with my hand and use it, this does not give me access to the hammer as a thing-
in-itself either. Even in this case, the hammer is still related to a human, precisely
because it is being used by one of them.
Furthermore, there are many things about the hammer that I do not know,
no matter if I am looking at it or using it. If I do not know how to recognize dif-
ferent types of wood, then I will not know what type of wood the hammer’s han-
dle is made of. It could be oak, mahogany, or pine, among others. Merely looking
at the hammer without any knowledge of the types of wood will not give me this
information. But using the hammer will not give me this information either. And
of course, this does not mean that the handle is not made from a specific type of
wood, because it is. It merely means that I have no access to this information. So
even though I might believe that I am using the hammer as a thing-in-itself, that
is not exactly the case, because I ignore what type of wood the hammer’s handle
is made of. I am only interacting with a very limited version or distortion or car-
icature of what the hammer really is. In Harman’s terms, I am interacting with
the hammer as a sensual object, not as a real object.
We saw that Bunge claims that science is able to know the things-in-them-
selves. We also saw that he claims that mathematical objects are fictional, since
they do not have an autonomous existence, we only feign that they do. In this
sense, I argued that, using Harman’s terminology, mathematical objects are not
real objects, but sensual objects instead, which is contrary to Meillassoux’s point
of view. One question that can be asked at this point is: what about the empirical
sciences? Mathematics alone cannot give us any knowledge of things-in-them-
selves, but surely the empirical sciences can, as Bunge claims. I believe that the
problem with that point of view is that the objects that are studied by the empir-
ical sciences are related to those sciences in a particular way, insofar as they are
objects that are being studied. They are not entirely unrelated to, or discon-
nected from, the scientists that study them. However, this does not mean that
those objects, insofar as they are real objects, do not exist independently of the
scientists that study them. As real objects, they do exist by themselves,
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independently of humans. But insofar as they are being actively studied by a
group of scientists at any given moment in time, they are sensual objects. Con-
sider the following example, taken from Philip Kitcher:
Start with a relatively simple situation. A behavioral biologist is observing a
baboon troop. Over a period of several hours he records the episodes in
which one of the animals grooms another, carefully noting the names of
the animals (who groomed whom) and the time interval through which
grooming occurred. Each entry in the notebook records the perceptual ac-
quisition of a belief. Focus on any one. The observer is initially scanning the
troop. He sees the male he calls “Caliban” approach the female he calls
“Miranda.” There is a sequence of facial expressions and gestures, at the
end of which Caliban crouches behind Miranda and plucks at her fur. Our
biologist presses a button on his stopwatch and quietly moves to a position
from which he can gain a better angle on the interaction. After a few
minutes, Miranda shrugs and moves away. Another button on the stop-
watch is pressed, and the biologist writes in the notebook, “Caliban—Mi-
randa, 6:43.” That notation serves as an extension of declarative memory,
something from which the biologist can later retrieve the belief that Caliban
groomed Miranda for a period of six minutes and forty-three seconds.”
(Kitcher, 1993: 222)
We feign that mathematical objects exist independently of the people that think
of them, and in a different sense we also feign that the objects studied by the
empirical sciences exist independently of the people that study them. In the case
of mathematical entities, these are brain processes that do not have an external
referent, but in the case of the objects studied by the empirical sciences, these
do exist by themselves in the external world. But here is the point: if the behav-
ioral biologist from Kitcher’s example did not exist, then the baboons that he is
observing would not be called “Caliban” and “Miranda”. They would be male and
female baboons, but they would not have names. That is not to say that they
would not have specific features that distinguish them as individual baboons. As
real entities, they exist independently of the biologist that is observing them. But
they could not be called “Caliban” and “Miranda” if no one gave them those
names.
5 CONCLUDING REMARKS
The idea that there can be a general theory of objects might seem absurd at
first. As we have seen, Bunge did not agree with this idea when he published
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Ontology I: The Furniture of the World. However, he changed his mind several
decades later, when he developed a general theory of objects in an appendix to
Matter and Mind. To my knowledge, that theory has not been further developed.
It is my belief that anyone who wishes to further elaborate Bunge’s general
theory of objects can greatly benefit by studying Harman’s works. I also believe
that anyone who wishes to further develop object-oriented ontology can greatly
benefit by studying Bunge’s works. There are key differences between these
thinkers, but they also have important things in common.
One point that will be worthwhile to explore in future works is a comparison
between Bunge and Harman regarding the terms “matter” and “materialism”.
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